Have you ever wondered how the system without a central server, without one source of truth, can be safe and sound? How can a network of equal peers trust each other when any of them can be a bad actor? Sounds like a paradox. If someone can say something, how do you know what to believe?
This is not just a theoretical puzzle; This is the basic challenge we faced by building a security layer GenosendbOur distributed chart database. We set off on a journey filled with fascinating script “Co-If”, trying to break your own system to make it stronger. Today we want to share this journey with you, deistifying how you can verify solid security in a completely decentralized world.
The secret is not one magic ball. It is a beautifully layered architecture of trust, verification and joint “constitution” set in the software itself. Let’s immerse ourselves in the minds of our heroes and villains: a super administrator, legal manager and a malicious user Eve.
Each peer leading Genosdb has its own bodyguard: the Software Security Manager (SSM). SSM task is uncomplicated but critical: it checks any information from other peers and asks: “Should I believe it?” By default, he doesn’t trust anyone. Verifies. All.
Its rules are our RBAC system (access to roles), which determines what different roles-as Superadmin, Manager or Guest-Moga to do.
Our villain, Eve, wants a manager’s strength, which allows her to write data. He is currently a guest. How can it promote himself?
EVE A Plan: Direct approach
Eve tries to send a command to the network with the inscription: “Make me a manager.” Technically, it is a writing operation {Rola: “Manager”} to its own user profile node (user: Eve_address). He signs this command with his own key and gives it.
SSM answer:
An sincere peer, Alice, receives this command. Her SSM appears in action:
- Signature control: “Is this command really from Ewa?” Checks the digital signature. Pass.
- Checking authority: “Okay, it’s from Ewa. But who is The eve? “SSM checks its EVE database.
- CONTRUCTIONS: “Can a guy assign roles?” SSM consults with internal principles (our immobile definitions). The answer is huge NO. Only roles can do this with the consent of the assignment.
- Verdict: Operation rejected.
Eve was rejected. For the rest of the network, it’s like it never happened.
Eve’s Plan B: Manipulated customer
Ewa is clever. Modifies his local client, changing the rules to say that guests Power Assign roles. He sends the same command again. It allows her local, manipulated SSM.
SSM response to Alice peers:
The command arrives at Alice’s peer. The process is the same, but the critical step is #3:
- CONTRUCTIONS: SSM Alice consults His own, unarmed in the rules. He doesn’t care about what Eve’s Rulebook says. According to the “constitution”, the guest cannot assign roles.
- Verdict: Operation rejected.
Safety lesson: The office is not demanded; This is verified. Ewa cannot promote herself, because the power of granting roles belongs to the higher authority that she does not control. Network consensus on rules She overcomes her local manipulations.
This led us to a fascinating problem. Our Superadmin is unique. Their authority does not come from the database; This is due to the hardenings for the initial software configuration. They are the final source of trust.
But we hit the hook: when our Superadmin tried to attribute the role to a recent user, some peers rejected the order! Why? Because Superadmin did not have a user profile node in the database, so SSM on other peers incorrectly classified them as a guest.
It was Trust distribution paradox: The final authority was refused because it was not yet “in the system”.
Solution: a two -level source of truth
We re -re -invited SSM logic to reflect how true trust works. Currently compatible with a clear, hierarchical process:
- Constitutional check (immobile truth): . First thing SSM checks that the sender’s address is on a hardcode Superadmin list. If so, Superadmin is their role. End of history. They have final authority.
- Public record control (energetic truth): If the sender is NO On the Superadmin list, SSM then checks the distributed database in terms of their role (e.g. manager, user). This role is considered vital only because it was placed there by someone from the permissions (Super-Admin!).
This uncomplicated, elegant change has repaired everything. He established a clear chain of trust.
This raised the final, most practical question: what if Superadmin promotes the user to the manager, and this manager immediately tries to perform the action? The equator with a network delay can get the action of a manager before Receives a message about their promotion.
Scenario:
- T1: Super admin promotes Bob to a manager.
- Q2: Bob performs the record immediately.
- T3: A tardy peer, Charlie, first receives Bob’s action.
- SSM Charlie: Checks the role of Bob. The news from the promotion has not yet arrived, so he sees Bob as a guest. That’s correct Rejects share.
- T4: News from the promotion from the Super Administrator finally come to Charlie’s peers.
- T5: If Bob’s action is carried out, Charlie’s SSM knows he is a manager and Accepts This.
Safety lesson: This is not a security failure; his Final cohesion in action. The system correctly treats safety against immediate availability. He will not accept the action until he obtains verifiable evidence of the authority behind him. This is the way the system says: “I have not yet received a note about your promotion, so I can’t confirm it until I do it.”
Building a really safe and sound dispersed system is a journey of continuous learning, testing and evolution. The scenarios we have gone through are just a look at countless hours that our team spent the Genosdb stress test. We believe that by understanding and covering the unique challenges of decentralized environments – from malicious actors to a uncomplicated delay of the network – we can build systems that are not only functional, but clearly trustworthy.
Our work on the software safety manager is ongoing. We are constantly investigating recent matters and improving our architecture, driven by the enthusiastic belief that the future is distributed and that the future must be safe and sound.
We hope that this look for the veil was as invigorating for you as for us. The P2P safety world is a fascinating border and we are excited that we are discovering it.
